We explore a model of equilibrium selection in coordination games, where agents stochastically adjust their strategies to changes in their local environment. Instead of playing perturbed best{response, we assume that agents follow a rule of \switching to better strategies more likely". We relate this behavior to work of Rosenthal (1989) and Schlag (1998). Our main results are that both strict Nash equilibria of the coordination game correspond to stationary distributions of the process, hence evolution of play is not ergodic, but instead depends on initial conditions. However, coordination on the risk{dominant equilibrium occurs with probability one whenever the initial share of agents playing the risk{dominant strategy has at least some positive measure, how ever small, within the whole population.
Introduction
The seminal work of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) , henceforth denoted as KMR, and Young (1993) has attracted much interest in evolutionary models for equilibrium selection in coordination games. Subsequent models have re ned this work by introducing local interaction (e.g., Ellison, 1993; Blume, 1993 Blume, , 1995 , or by enlarging the strategy space of an agent (Ely, 1995; Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo, 1997; Kim and Sobel, 1995) . The present paper belongs to the rst category in featuring local interaction. It follows a new line in studying alternative ideas for modelling the individual behavior of an agent.
The usual story in the evolutionary approach is that there is a large population of agents, each facing a situation of repeated interaction with other agents. The interaction is modelled as a symmetric 2 2 coordination game where agents are restricted to pure strategies. The evolution of play within the population is driven by the assumption that agents may switch strategies. Since opponents may change their strategy, too, each agent repeatedly plays the coordination game against a changing mixture of strategies. An agents task is to adjust his strategy to the environment he faces.
The original assumption of KMR (1993) and Young (1993) is that agents adjust their strategy by playing perturbed best{response. With high probability they play a best{response to their environment, with remaining low probability they simply play random. The rst part is based on the idea that agents are in uenced by payo di erences, the second part captures noisy behavior and models, e.g., individual mistakes or deliberate experimentation of an agent. Based on this assumption the surprisingly strong result is that evolution selects the risk{dominant equilibrium as de ned by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) . 1 Perhaps the strongest objection to this result has been formulated by Bergin and Lipman (1996) who show that the equilibrium selection result is based on the speci c assumption that random play is su ciently similar in di erent states of the process. In fact they show that, if one allows the noise rate to depend on the state of the process then every invariant distribution of the noiseless process and thus every strict Nash equilibrium of the coordination game can be selected.
2
One possible way to proceed is to make the noise part explicit by modelling the economic, social, or psychological source of it. A recent approach in this direction is van Damme and Weibull (1998) , where agents rationally choose to make mistakes because it is too costly to avoid these mistakes completely. The resulting endogenous noise rates are shown to be su ciently similar across states, which establishes the result of risk{dominance. An alternative is to leave the paradigm of perturbed best{response behavior and choose a di erent model for agents' adjustment, which nonetheless features important properties of the original approach. This is the way we proceed in this paper.
Intuitively speaking, pure best{response adjustment says: adjust to best strategies with probability one. This holds true even if the other strategy earns only in nitesimally larger payo s. Hence adjustment is very payo {sensitive and in fact deterministic. At any time t an agents probability to change his strategy is either 1 if the other strategy is a best{response, 0 if not. Our starting point is to study a smoothened version of best-response, which says: adjust to better strategies more likely. In a static framework this simple intuitive idea is related to a model of Rosenthal (1989) .
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From a decision theoretic point of view it resembles much the behavioral notion in proportional imitation as introduced by Schlag (1998) , although we do not consider actual imitation in this model.
The rst consequence of our assumption is that the strategy adjustment of an agent is less payo {sensitive. Probabilities to switch lie within the whole interval 0; 1] rather than in the subset f0; 1g. In e ect, many times both strategies will have positive probability to be played. This corresponds to the randomness e ect of noise in perturbed best{response. However, the second and main feature of our approach is that agents are still in uenced by payo di erences, which we see as the essence of pure best{response behavior. While the latter assumes that in nitesimally small payo di erences are weighted in the same way as large payo di erences our assumptions say that payo di erences matter the more the larger they are.
Based on this approach our main results show that agents are more likely to coordinate on the risk{dominant equilibrium. In this sense our model supports the result of KMR (1993), Young (1993) , and others and moderates the critique of Bergin and Lipman (1996) . However, contrary to most other approaches, in our model the risk{dominated equilibrium still corresponds to a stationary distribution of the stochastic process. In other words, the process is not ergodic and, in fact, basins of attraction of both equilibria are non{empty. Thus, the question on which equilibrium agents will actually coordinate depends on initial conditions. Note that this is true under pure best{response adjustment as well. In order to obtain an equilibrium selection result noise needs to be introduced, which turns the process into an ergodic process and eliminates one of the two equilibria. This, however, produces a common paradox as it has been indicated, for instance, by Blume (1993, p415) . While the theory stated that all players will always choose the risk{dominant strategy in the future, computer simulations showed \that the outcome depends strongly on the initial conditions of the process. If the initial frequency of down i.e. the risk{dominated strategy] is su ciently high, the process converges to all players choosing down."
A contribution of our approach is to resolves this paradox, by answering the equilibrium selection problem without necessarily eliminating one of the two equilibria.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section we de ne our model of local interaction. Section 3 introduces the class of coordination games we want to look at. In section 4 the idea of stochastic strategy adjustment is made precise and our two main behavioral assumptions are formulated. In view of a better motivation these assumptions are related to other work in section 5. Section 6 then pins down the model. Results are obtained and discussed in sections 7 to 10. Section 11 concludes.
Local Interaction
Similarly to other models (Blume 1993 (Blume , 1995 Ellison, 1993) we consider a spatial model of local interaction. Precisely, we assume an in nite population of agents that are located on the ndimensional integer lattice Z n . The dimension of the lattice can have any value n 1. Results in our model do not depend on n. By identifying each agent with his or her location the space Z n represents the population of agents. Typically, agents will be denoted as x; y; z 2 Z n .
Every agent is assumed to interact with a nite set of other agents, his so{called neighbors.
For every agent x 2 Z n we de ne the neighborhood to be given by N(x) := fy 2 Z n j jy ? xj = 1g where j j denotes the Euclidean distance within Z n . Thus neighbors are agents that are one step away in at most one of n dimensions. Sometimes this kind of neighborhood interaction is also called nearest neighbor interaction. If n equals one, neighbors are located both to the right and to the left of an agent. For n = 2, the set of neighbors consists, in addition, of those agents that are located to the top and to the bottom of an agent.
Of course, there are various other possibilities for de ning appropriate neighborhood structures, even if one sticks to the general assumption of an n-dimensional lattice. And intuition suggests that di erent structures will support di erent outcomes. Important research therefore focuses on robustness{checks with respect to di erent neighborhood structures. An early approach in this direction has been made by Ellison (1993) in comparing global with local interaction. A recent discussion of general neighborhood structures is given in Morris (1996) and Young (1998) .
Yet, in this model we restrict our analysis to the nearest neighbor interaction as de ned above. The reason for doing this is simply that this neighborhood structure has already been studied in other models, as well (Blume, 1993 (Blume, , 1995 Ellison, 1993) . As we do not want to focus on the role of the neighborhood structure itself, but rather on the behavior of agents within such a neighborhood structure, this gives us the possibility to relate our ndings to those of others without any confusion about possible di erences in underlying neighborhood structures. Our main contribution shall be a check of robustness with respect to an agents behavior rather than with respect to the considered neighborhood structure.
Coordination Games
We consider the class of symmetric 2 2 coordination games that are given by the payo matrix in Figure We assume all values to be nite and both, a > d and b > c, hence (Top; Top) and (Bottom; Bottom) are the two strict Nash equilibria of the game. There exists another symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, where both players put probability b?c a?d+b?c on strategy Top. However, we are not going to focus on this equilibrium since we restrict players to play pure strategies only.
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Time is modelled continuously. At any time t 2 I R + 0 to each agent x 2 Z n there is assigned one of the two possible actions, Top, henceforth denoted by T, or Bottom, henceforth denoted by B. The collection of actions over the whole population at time t is given by a mapping where t (x) denotes the action of agent x at time t. A mapping t is also called a con guration. Denote X the set of all possible con gurations.
Agents continuously and uniformly interact with their neighbors. We assume that at any time t each agent is sequentially matched with his 2n neighbors.
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In each single match the coordination game is played with every agent choosing his assigned action. Denote for agent x 2 Z n by s (x; t ) the accumulated payo from these matches, when the play of the population, in particular of his neighbors, is determined by con guration t and agent x plays strategy s 2 fT; Bg, hence
where G( ; ) calculates the payo from the matrix in Figure 1 . 4 Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo (1997) distinguish between cases where d b and d < b. Games in the rst subclass are called stag-hunt games, games in the second pure coordination games. Our results hold for both classes.
5 In this paper we do not model the actual matching procedure but concentrate on accumulated payo s.
Stochastic Strategy Adjustment
In our model we pursue the idea that agents stochastically adjust their strategy to a changing environment given by the play in their local neighborhood. We do not follow the usual approach in the evolutionary literature that studies boundedly rational behavior by assuming rst best{ response adjustment which is then perturbed by some form of noise. Instead, we consider a simple adjustment rule that connects probabilities to switch from one strategy to the other and payo s of both strategies directly. Roughly said, the main assumptions are the following (see below): (1) agents stay with their strategy in case of successful coordination with their neighbors, (2) agents are more likely to switch if the other strategy earns relatively higher payo s.
Technically we model individual probabilities to adjust a strategy by so{called ip rates. These rates are real{valued functions and determine the probability for an agent to switch ( ip) to the other strategy within an in nitesimally short period of time. Precisely this works as follows.
Denote r s (x; t ) 2 0; 1) the ip rate of agent x given the state of the population t with x himself playing strategy s. Then for # 0 it holds that Prob t+ (x) 6 = s] = r s (
Thus, given t , for in nitesimally short periods of time the probability for agent x to adjust his strategy within that period from s 2 fT; Bg to the complementary strategy s C equals the product of the ip rate r s (x; t ) times the length of the time period. The next two assumptions give the restrictions we want to make on an agent's adjustment.
Assumption 1 (Nash equilibrium) Flip rates are zero if and only if all agents in the neighborhood coordinate on the same strategy, i.e. agents play a Nash equilibrium. Precisely, for any x 2 Z n ; t 2 X; s 2 fT; Bg r s (x; t ) = 0 , 8y 2 N(x) : t (y) = s:
Assumption 2 (Flips to better strategies are more likely) Flip rates depend on payo di erences in a linear monotonic way. The higher the relative payo advantage of a strategy the larger the rate to ip to this strategy. Precisely, for any x 2 Z n ; t 2 X r B (x; t ) ? r T (x; t ) = ( T (x; t ) ? B (x; t ));
where 0 < < 1.
Assumption 1 captures the idea that individual learning forces are weak at Nash equilibria of the game. If no single neighboring opponent plays the other strategy, this other strategy is not a best{response to any of the neighbors' currently played strategy. Hence there is no reason to play that other strategy. Thus ip rates are zero. In this situation an agent's behavior coincides with pure best{response behavior.
Assumption 2 is the important behavioral assumption in our model. It is motivated by the idea that agents do not over{sensitively react to changes in their local environment by always adjusting their strategy towards best{responses with probability one. Instead, agents are assumed to follow a rule of adjusting towards better strategies more likely. The larger the payo di erence between the other strategy and the current strategy is the more likely it is to ip to the other strategy. The sensitivity of this relation is governed by the parameter , which we assume to be nite. 6 The larger the more sensitive the adjustment with respect to payo di erences. Since payo s in the underlying coordination game are nite as well, ip rates are always nite. This ensures, by (2), that agents are locked in for in nitesimally short periods of time. During these time periods they are`programmed' to the chosen strategy as mentioned above.
Note that under Assumption 2 the probability to ip is not necessarily zero whenever the payo of the other strategy is less than the one that is currently earned. Assumption 1 says that if there is at least one neighbor who plays the other strategy there is also a strictly positive probability for the respective agent to switch to that strategy, even if it makes him worse o . Yet by Assumption 2 it follows that after he has switched to a bad strategy the probability to switch back again to the good strategy is always higher than the one before.
A feature of our approach is that with probability zero two agents ip at exactly the same time. Hence, individual strategy adjustments are non{synchronized, which allows us to ignore the e ects of simultaneous strategy revision.
Relation to Other Work
In a static framework Rosenthal (1989) has studied an idea similar to our approach. For general two person games with nite numbers of strategies the author explores a solution concept where, instead of playing best{responses with probability one, players use \better responses with probabilities not lower than worse responses" (op.cit., p274). Using a notation similar to ours this idea can be made precise as follows. Let p i and p j denote the probabilities with which a player intends to use his strategies i and j. Let i and j denote the payo s of strategies i and j given some chosen strategy of the other player. Then Rosenthal assumes that if p i > 0 and p j > 0 p i ? p j = ( i ? j ); (5) where is a nite parameter playing the same role as in our model. Comparing equation (5) to our Assumption 2 shows that our model can in fact be seen as a dynamic version of Rosenthal's model of boundedly rational behavior. Instead of relating static choice probabilities to payo di erences we assume that probabilities to change a strategy are connected to corresponding di erences in payo s.
If we look at an agent's problem from a decision theoretic point of view, the idea of Assumption 2 is also closely related to the notion of a proportional imitation rule as introduced by Schlag (1998) . There an imitation rule is called proportional if the di erence in probabilities of switching from strategy i to strategy j and vice versa is proportional to the payo di erence between strategies i and j. In Schlag's model payo s are determined via a multi{armed bandit and an agent can learn other strategies and payo s by sampling other agents. He then (randomly) decides to imitate, i.e. switch to the other agent's strategy, or not. This is, of course, di erent to our model since agents do not imitate, nor do they observe other agents' payo s. Still, given an agent's information about his current strategy's payo and the payo of another strategy (be it via sampling or by own calculation) our main assumptions coincide in the sense that probabilities to switch are proportional to the di erence in payo s between both strategies.
Definition of Flip Rates
In order to bring Assumptions 1 and 2 into being recall the payo matrix of the underlying coordination game (Figure 1 ). Given a con guration t the payo agent x earns from playing strategy T or B can be computed as where N^s(x; t ) gives the number of agent x's neighbors who play strategyŝ when the state of the population is determined by con guration t .
In view of Assumptions 1 and 2 there are still many possibilities to de ne ip rates, as they leave some degrees of freedom. The rst assumption gives boundary conditions while the second one xes relative values only. We will stick to the simplest version possible, which is based on di erences as given in equation (8).
De nition 1 (Stochastic Strategy Adjustment) For x 2 Z n and t 2 X de ne De nition 1 is a clear aggregation of Assumptions 1 and 2. Flip rates are zero whenever all neighbors of x play the same strategy as x. For every con guration t the di erence between ip rates equals the di erence of payo s times the sensitivity parameter .
Note that our assumptions imply that every additional neighbor that plays the other strategy increases the probability to switch to that strategy by a value equal to the equilibrium payo of that strategy, and simultaneously decreases the probability by a value equal to the o {equilibrium payo of that strategy. The increase can be seen as corresponding to the possibility to earn the equilibrium payo after a switch to that strategy. The decrease of the probability is then related to a simultaneous loss of the o {equilibrium payo that is currently earned. In this sense factors (a ? d) and (b ? c) capture revenue minus opportunity cost of adjusting from one strategy to the other. Of course, since agents play a coordination game these terms are always positive. Thus, if there is at least one neighbor playing the other strategy, the probability of switching to that strategy is positive, as well. However, the concrete likelihood of an actual switch is determined by the magnitude of these terms. In the rst case we are in a symmetric situation. The probability of switching depends just on the number of neighbors that play the other strategy, equally weighted for both strategies. In the language of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) this case is equivalent to saying that both equilibria are equally risky while if (a ? d) > (b ? c) strategy pro le (T; T) is the risk{dominant equilibrium. In our model (a ? d) > (b ? c) implies that we are in an asymmetric situation, where strategy T is weighted more strongly, which may suggest already the direction of play within our population. We will restrict attention to this case for the rest of this paper. However, before we do so, we quickly want to mention its relation to the symmetric case.
Using common results from the theory of interacting particle systems (see Liggett (1985) for a good introduction) it can easily be shown that ip rates in De nition 1 de ne a unique Markov process f t g t 0 on the state space of all con gurations X. In the following we call this process the adjustment process. In the symmetric case, where (a ? d) = (b ? c), the behavior of this process is equivalent to the behavior of the so{called voter model, which was introduced independently by Cli ord and Sudbury (1973) and Holley and Liggett (1975) . In the asymmetric case, where (a ? d) > (b ? c), the process is equivalent to the so{called biased voter model. This process was rst considered by Schwartz (1977) and later by Bramson & Gri eath (1980 , 1981 . Bramson & Gri eath looked for results concerning the evolution of the process to describe the possible spread of cancerous cells, an approach that was introduced by Williams & Bjerknes (1972) , while Schwartz was more interested in the duality theory of a larger class of Markov processes.
We now turn to an analysis of the evolution of play when agents adjust according to 
The Sensitivity Parameter
Since the behavior of the adjustment process is equivalent to that of the biased voter model results on the former follow from results on the latter. We therefore skip a reproduction of corresponding proofs and instead provide an intuition. The rst observation is that as long as is nite its value plays no role for the long run behavior (t = 1) of the process.
Proposition 1 For < 1 the long run behavior of the adjustment process is independent of . Proof: The claim follows immediately from the fact that a change of simply results into a change of the time scale and that properties concerning long run behavior (t = 1) are independent of the time scale.
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In the short and in the medium run the value of does, of course, play a big role for the behavior of the process. For example, the expected number of agents that play strategy T at any nite time t 0 does depend on the concrete value of . Low values of create high inertia within the adjustment of an agent, while high values speed up the evolution of play. However, since technically any e ects of a change of correspond to a rescaling of time, a change has no qualitative implications. Convergence is the same for every nite . Since we will focus on long run behavior of the process only we normalize = 1.
Clustering
One of the most important problems is, of course, the characterization of the set of invariant distributions of the adjustment process f t g t 0 , since these will be the only possible limiting distributions for the process. Obviously, the prominent measures B and T that correspond to the strict Nash equilibria (B; B) and (T; T), concentrating on the states where everybody plays B (denoted as B) and everybody plays T (denoted as T) respectively, are both invariant. So the process will never be ergodic. Once the process is in one of these states it will never leave it again as they are both absorbing states.
This fact corresponds to the results of KMR (1993), Young (1993) , and others before introducing mutations. With pure best{response behavior either states where the whole population plays one of the two strict Nash equilibria are absorbing states. Only after the noise component is added a selection between these states occurs. In our model, as we will see, a selection occurs already on the basis of stochastic strategy adjustment.
Certainly also every convex combination of B and T is invariant as in general the set of invariant distributions is a compact convex set. So the question is, if besides B and T there exists any other extreme invariant distribution for the process. The answer is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The only extreme invariant distributions of the adjustment process f t g t 0 are B and T , that concentrate on B and T, respectively.
The key to Proposition 2 lies in the analysis of the so{called dual process.
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For the adjustment process this process is a continuous time particle jump process on Z n where each particle jumps with rate (b ? c) to a neighboring site and also produces a particle in an unoccupied site with a rate equal to (a ? d) ? (b ? c). If a particle attempts to occupy a site that is already occupied the two particles coalesce. The result then follows from Schwartz (1977) who has shown that whenever the dual process of a Markov process on X is monotone and ful ls a certain growth condition, then any invariant distribution must be a convex combination of the two measures B and T .
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Let f t g t 0 be the adjustment process that starts with initial distribution and let t denote the distribution of that process at time t. An immediate consequence of Proposition 2 is that if lim t!1 t exists, the process clusters, that is for any x; y 2 Z n the probability of f t (x) 6 = t (y)g converges to 0 as t goes to in nity. Thus, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 The only long run con gurations are those where all agents coordinate on one of the two Nash equilibria.
Since long run con gurations are homogenous the next question is, on which equilibrium agents will coordinate more likely. In other words, for which initial distributions will agents coordinate on the risk{dominant equilibrium? The answer to these questions will give the desired selection result.
Coordination on the Risk{Dominant Equilibrium
Note that invariant distributions of the adjustment process are translation invariant, where the latter is de ned as follows.
De nition 2 A probability measure on X is translation invariant if for any nite collection of agents (x 1 ; : : :; x k ), any pro le of strategies (i 1 ; : : :; i k ), with i j 2 fT; Bg, and z 2 Z n (z + x 1 ) = i 1 ; : : : ; (z + x k ) = i k = (x 1 ) = i 1 ; : : :; (x k ) = i k ;
i.e. probabilities do not depend on z.
Since the dynamics of the adjustment process are translation invariant as well, in the sense that the assumed behavior is the same for every agent x 2 Z n , this suggests that the property of translation invariance plays an important role in the model. The next result fully characterizes convergence of play given it starts with a translation invariant distribution.
Proposition 3 ? c) , the latter is non{negative, hence the probability for playing T at time t is non{decreasing in t. Since t 2 0; 1], it must converge and consequently, the process clusters. The fact that = (B) follows from the translation invariance of and hence of t , which implies that (B) = t (B). See Schwartz (1977) for details.
Equation (12) nicely states the long run e ects of interaction in our model. In general, any limiting distribution must be a convex combination of the two measures B and T . Now for a translation invariant distribution the parameter that determines the mixture between these measures is already uniquely determined by the value (B), which is the probability that all agents initially start with playing strategy B. Once this probability is zero we obtain convergence to T . On the other hand, convergence to B is obtained only in the case where the process starts already in that particular state, i.e. (B) = 1. This is a quite substantial result which is reformulated in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 If the initial distribution of the process is translation invariant, and almost surely at least one agent plays strategy T at the beginning, then with probability one agents coordinate on the risk{dominant equilibrium.
As an example for the last result consider the process that starts with initial distribution , being the Bernoulli product measure with parameter where for each agent x 2 Z n ; ( (x) = T) = : Certainly is translation invariant. If > 0; (B) = 0, hence agents will coordinate on the risk{dominant equilibrium. While the state of the population at the beginning is characterized by individual independence, in the long run the evolution of the process in time eventually leads to complete unanimity. More than that, all players eventually agree to coordinate on the risk{ dominant equilibrium. The driving force that makes this coordination possible is the adjustment mechanism determined by the interaction between players. Even though this interaction is locally restricted to the neighborhood of a player, because of the considerable overlap between these neighborhoods its e ect is on the population as a whole.
Remark: The above result is an immediate implication of (a ? d) > (b ? c), i.e. strategy T being risk{dominant. Denote = a?d b?c the ratio of these terms, measuring the degree of risk{dominance. An important e ect of approaching 1, i.e. both equilibria becoming equally risky, is that the expected waiting time for the process to hit any absorbing state, either T or B, can take very large values. This result is due to Cox (1989) and holds for nite populations where, contrary to the in nite case, the probability to hit an absorbing state in nite time equals 1. Consider, for example, a nite population of N agents located on the torus imbedded in the 2{dimensional lattice Z 2 . Let the initial distribution of play be given by the nite version of with > 0. Then, as approaches 1, the expected waiting time to hit any equilibrium state tends to 2 N 2 log N(? log ? (1 ? ) log(1 ? ) (13) as N becomes large.
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See Cox (1989) for more. Thus, when both equilibria are equally risky and the population is large stochastic strategy adjustment needs very long waiting times until the whole population coordinates on either of the Nash{equilibria, even though interaction is restricted to local neighborhoods.
The Spread of Risk{Dominant Play
So far results have been obtained for the case when the initial state of the population may be described by translation invariant distributions. It is interesting to see how risk{dominant play spreads starting from an arbitrary set of agents that play strategy T at time zero. Here lies a great advantage of any spatial model over those like KMR (1993) and Young (1993) , where the population is not endowed with a spatial structure and therefore the possibility to study a real spread of a strategy is not given. Denote the set of agents that play T a time zero by A Z n . Since we are not aware of any proof of Proposition 4 we shall give a precise proof in the appendix. The proposition shows that the probability to hit the absorbing state B in nite time depends on the number of agents that play T at the beginning and the ratio of individual weights of adjustment = a?d b?d . Since T is risk{dominant this ratio is always larger than 1. So the probability decreases exponentially as the number of initial T{strategists grows. Note that the probability does not depend on the spatial spread of A, i.e. how densely these agents are actually distributed within the population. The only thing that matters is the cardinality of A. In particular, if A is in nite we obtain again almost sure coordination on the risk{dominant equilibrium.
In (14) the degree of risk{dominance, expressed by , directly enters the equation. The more risk{dominant strategy T is, the faster the probability to enter the state B decreases as the size of A grows. In the other direction, as both equilibria become equally risky ( approaches 1) the probability to reach the equilibrium where everybody plays B tends to 1 for nite A. Now suppose that strategy T is`very' risk{dominant in the sense that >> 1. By Proposition 4, for large A the event f A = 1g has overwhelming probability. Denote D r = fx 2 Z n : jxj rg the ball of radius r around the origin and let ( A t ) Z n be the set of agents that play strategy T given con guration A t . The next proposition shows that, conditioned on f A = 1g, strategy T eventually spreads at least linearly. Thus again, if A is in nite risk{dominant play almost surely overtakes the whole population in a linear fashion.
Proposition 5 For every set A 6 = ; of agents playing strategy T at time zero,
For a proof of Proposition 5 see Bramson and Gri eath (1981) , who also show that the constant depends only the dimension n and the parameter . It is instructive to compare the result to a similar one in the equilibrium selection model of Hofbauer (1998) . There, the author studies a travelling wave approach to de ne a spatially dominant equilibrium that is shown to coincide with risk{dominance in symmetric 2 2 coordination games. A notable observation is that the speed of his wave is closely related to the asymptotic growth of the set of T{players in our model. Consider, for example the simple coordination game with o {equilibrium payo s c and d equal to zero. Then it can be shown that the asymptotic speed of a spread of T under the adjustment process is equal to 1 4n p n a?b a+b (Bramson and Gri eath, 1981) . The wave speed in Hofbauer (1998) using replicator dynamics as reaction dynamics equals q e 2 a?b p a+b , where e captures an additional migration rate of agents. In Hofbauer's model the population is distributed on the one-dimensional continuum I R. Hence, taking the same dimension n = 1 in our model, risk{dominant play spreads at a similar speed as in the model of Hofbauer. At the same time the underlying geometric structure of the population is, of course, substantially di erent. This suggests that the result in Proposition 5 does not depend on the special structure of the space Z n as one might, perhaps, have suspected.
Conclusion
We have studied a new form of strategy adjustment behavior by agents who repeatedly play a symmetric 2 2 coordination game with local neighbors. Rather than considering perturbations of pure best{response we focus on the original idea of best{response, which says that agents are in uenced by payo di erences. We smooth this in uence by assuming that, instead of switching to best responses with probability one, agents switch to better responses more likely. The underlying idea of this assumption corresponds to the bounded rationality model of Rosenthal (1989) and the notion of proportional imitation of Schlag (1998) . Based on a spatial model of local interaction our results say that agents are in fact more likely to coordinate on the risk{dominant equilibrium. In this sense our approach supports the results of KMR (1993), Young (1993) , and others. Precisely, in our model risk{dominant play prevails with probability one whenever the initial fraction of agents that play the risk{dominant strategy has at least some positive measure. Since our population is located on the in nite lattice Z n , this holds whenever the initial fraction contains in nitely many agents, independent of the spatial distribution of these agents. This is obtained, e.g., by starting either with a corresponding Dirac measure or with independent probability assignments to each player, where strategy T has at least some positive probability.
Our model shares with others the special feature that agents do not have the possibility to in uence the set of opponents they face. Every agent interacts with a local neighborhood that is exogenously given and remains xed forever. In contrast, Ely (1995) and Bhaskar and VegaRedondo (1997) have shown that once agents are allowed to choose their set of opponents the situation looks totally di erent. They introduce a number of available locations where agents can meet and exclusively play the game with each other. Thus the choice of a location directly determines the set of opponents an agent is going to face. The e ect is that agents will no longer coordinate on the risk{dominant but instead choose the payo {dominant equilibrium.
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This suggest that results on equilibrium selection do not only depend upon the characteristics of the noise process or the considered adjustment behavior of an agent but also, and perhaps even more, on the speci c kind of interaction that is assumed. In consequence, the next questions are: once interaction structures are modelled endogenously, how do these structures evolve themselves? What are the mechanisms that exist between playing speci c strategies and interacting with speci c neighbors? How do these mechanisms work? Do strategies perhaps arise as a direct consequence of interaction patterns? Or, in other words, do interaction patterns de ne the (local) environment in such a way that speci c play can be observed that would not be observed if the interaction patterns were di erent? Promising research in this direction is already started by Morris (1996) , Berninghaus and Ehrhart (1998), and Young (1998) .
